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Research and Reference Service

WORLDWIDE PUBLIC REACTION TO THE CUBAN CRISIS

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Survey Research Studies
World Opinion Series

HIGHLIGHTS

In 1963, about four months after American insistence on the removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba, worldwide awareness of the crisis ranged from the great preponderance of the population in a number of countries down to as low as 29 per cent in Rio de Janeiro.

The predominant belief everywhere, among those aware of the Cuban crisis, was that the outcome had decreased the likelihood of nuclear war in the near future. In line with this feeling of improved chances for peace, the removal of U.S. nuclear missiles from bases near the Soviet Union (actually announced while the survey was underway) was favored except in Australia and West Germany. In Latin America, where a different question was asked, there was predominant approval of the existence of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, except among residents of Buenos Aires, where opinion divided evenly. No opinion on the issue, however, was considerable.

The effect of the Cuban crisis on worldwide reaction to the U.S. and to the U.S.S.R. was measured in four different ways:

1. In terms of advancement of national interests, the prevailing worldwide view was that the U.S. gained more than the Soviet Union, but only in West Germany, Britain and Bangkok did public opinion line up really decisively behind the view that the U.S. came out ahead. In a number of areas -- particularly in Latin America -- opinion divided rather evenly, and in Tehran the U.S.S.R. was given a clear-cut margin.

2. In terms of general opinion shifts, for the better or for the worse, there was relatively little net gain or loss reported about either nation as a result of the crisis. A comparison of results indicates that the U.S. bettered its position relative to the Soviet Union substantially in three countries and slightly in three more. The U.S.S.R. made slight net gains in France and relatively large gains in Tehran. But in the eight other areas the shifts of opinion were nearly equal.

3. In terms of approval of its conduct of foreign policy (largely answered in the framework of the Cuban crisis), the U.S. drew far more favorable reactions than the U.S.S.R. -- except in France, where results were almost identical for each nation, and Tehran, where the Soviet Union was judged much more favorably.

4. In a final dimension, reactions to the Cuban crisis appear, on balance, to represent somewhat more of a gain for the U.S.S.R. than for the U.S. Although the results were not completely clearcut and the question was limited to 10 of the 16 countries, there was a tendency -- most marked in France -- to attribute the desired peaceful outcome of the Cuban crisis more to Soviet moderation than to American military superiority.

FOREWORD

The present report, the last of a series, marks an initial limited step toward establishing periodic soundings of that intangible but important entity "World Opinion." The ultimate goal is to block out for general U.S. Government guidance the broad picture of world-wide sentiment about the U.S. and major issues of international relations. It will remain the function of other specific studies to fill in details as required on issues of importance as they arise, and in countries of particular significance.

This initial effort reflects more an aspiration than an achievement since the present extent of coverage is far from adequate to provide valid regional and world-wide generalizations. Africa is not as yet covered, the representation is particularly sketchy in the Near East, and in many countries it is only feasible at the present time to sample capital or major cities, rather than the national populations. (Details on the present samplings may be found in an appendix.) It is hoped that future efforts will progressively embody wider representation. In the meantime, the indications must be read, of course, with limitations of coverage in mind.

This particular set of soundings was taken in early 1963 in the wake of the Cuban crisis -- an event which surely qualifies as one of the major points of reference in post-war international relations. Other international developments were also part of the context of events conditioning the present survey, e.g. the Sino-Indian conflict, the Sino-Soviet disagreements and the Western disagreements about NATO and the Common Market.

In keeping with the broad purposes of this service, the reportage is both brief and broad. The accent is upon the tabular presentation of country and regional comparisons, the details of which readers of varied expertise and interest may interpret more fully. Survey measurements constitute, of course, only one technique of exploration to be considered along with other sources of information in drawing conclusions.

As an aid in ordering and consolidating the indications on various questions a net favorable index is provided as a supplement to the usual tabulation of alternative responses and no opinion. This index is obtained by subtracting the percentage of unfavorable responses from the percentage of favorable responses and yields a quick unitary index of the size and direction of predominant sentiment. "No opinion" is treated as neither favorable nor unfavorable. This index is presented only as a convenience, not as a substitute for the original figures which yield a more comprehensive picture of the findings.

Since the figures presented are based upon samples they are subject to a range of chance variation which increases as the size of sample diminishes. Little should be made of small differences, therefore, in the tables that follow, since they are often not reliably beyond chance variation and even where reliable are of little material significance. Attention should focus rather on the larger differences whose reliability is thereby more strongly established and which, because of their size, are more clearly of policy or program significance.

The generalizations presented in the text endeavor to take these statistical considerations into account. Readers desiring more precise information on sampling or other technical details about the present series of surveys are invited to consult the Research and Reference Service, USIA.

In the interest of simplicity, and in order to keep the present "World Opinion" paper within manageable limits, no figures have been included bearing upon trend changes in opinion over time. Such trend indications, when available, are presented in country or regional papers.

Awareness of the Cuban Crisis ...

Early in 1963, about four months after American insistence on the removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba, worldwide awareness of the crisis ranged from the great preponderance of the populations in a number of countries down to a mere 29 per cent in Rio de Janeiro. . In assessing the level of awareness in certain capital cities of the Near East and Far East, it should be noted that the sampling deliberately excluded or under-represented illiterates. (See Appendix - Sampling Summary.)

"Do you happen to have heard or read anything about a recent international crisis over Cuba?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
Great Britain	82%	10%	8% ..100%	(1186)
West Germany	89	5	6	(1202)
France	84	11	5	(1200)
Italy	62	27	11	(1200)
 <u>LATIN AMERICA</u>				
Mexico City	48	42	10	(389)
Buenos Aires	48	26	26	(481)
Rio de Janeiro	29	64	7	(392)
Caracas	73	18	9	(401)
 <u>NEAR EAST</u>				
Delhi	60	8	32	(500)
Tehran	81	10	9	(500)
Beirut	72	19	9	(459)
 <u>FAR EAST</u>				
Japan	63	20	17	(995)
Bangkok	93	3	4	(497)
Saigon	66	5	29	(493)
Singapore	82	11	7	(498)
Australia ¹	89	11	-	(830)

¹ In Australia question was phrased "Next, some questions on Cuba. Did you hear or read anything about the international crisis over Cuba, four months ago?"

Effects on World Peace ...

In the opinions of those who had heard of the Cuban crisis, the predominant reaction was that it had decreased the likelihood of nuclear war in the near future. In Latin America, the margin of the optimists over the pessimists was smaller than elsewhere.

"All things considered, do you think the effect of the recent Cuban crisis has been to increase or decrease the likelihood of nuclear war in the near future?"

	Net			No Differ-	No	Not	No. of
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Optimistic</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>ence (Vol.)</u>	<u>opinion</u>	<u>asked¹</u>	<u>cases</u>
West Germany	55	5%	60%	-%	24%	11% ..100%	(1202)
Great Britain	51	2	53	22	5	18	(1186)
France	46	3	49	-	32	16	(1200)
Italy	38	5	43	-	14	38	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>							
Caracas	16	14	30	-	15	41	(401)
Buenos Aires	15	8	23	8	9	52	(481)
Rio de Janeiro	14	4	18	3	4	71	(392)
Mexico City	9	15	24	7	2	52	(389)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Delhi	36	5	41	-	14	40	(500)
Tehran	27	20	47	-	14	19	(500)
Beirut	46	9	55	-	8	28	(459)
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Australia	32	5	37	29	4	25	(830)
Singapore	32	16	48	-	18	18	(498)
Bangkok	25	25	50	-	18	7	(497)
Japan	20	8	28	-	27	37	(995)
Saigon	17	14	31	-	21	34	(493)

¹ Those respondents who had heard nothing about the Cuban crisis were naturally not asked any of the questions following the introductory question. Percentages are based on the total sample, not just on those aware of the crisis. In Caracas, though 73 per cent claimed awareness of the crisis, only 59 per cent were felt from their answers on a probing question that followed to have precise enough knowledge of the crisis to answer the remaining questions. In Australia, the 89 per cent claiming awareness of the crisis was reduced to 76 per cent in the same manner.

The Issue of U.S. Nuclear Bases ...

Except in West Germany and Australia, the weight of opinion favored the removal of American nuclear missiles from bases near the Soviet Union, as the U.S.S.R. had withdrawn its missiles from Cuba. The removal of outdated U.S. missiles from Turkey was in fact announced while the survey was underway in some countries and before it was begun in other areas. Evidence from one nation, France, suggests that this event had little or no effect on responses to the question; tabulations of responses obtained before the announcement were similar in ratio to those made afterwards.

In Latin America, an allied but different question was posed which will be discussed below.

"Some people say that the U.S. should remove its nuclear missiles from bases near the Soviet Union, just as the Soviet Union removed its nuclear missiles from Cuba, near the U.S. Others say that the two cases are quite different, and the U.S. should not remove its missiles.

"With which of these views are you more inclined to agree?"

	Net	Remove U.S. nuclear missiles from bases near the Soviet Union	Don't remove U.S. nuclear missiles	Qualified answer	No opinion	Not asked	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Remove</u>						
Great Britain	27	49%	22%	7%	11%	18%..100%	(1186)
France ¹	26	45	19	-	20	16	(1200)
Italy	10	28	18	1	15	38	(1200)
West Germany	-5	29	34	2	24	11	(1200)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Tehran	50	58	8	7	8	19	(500)
Delhi	26	33	7	-	20	40	(500)
Beirut	19	41	22	1	8	28	(459)
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Japan	20	28	8	1	26	37	(995)
Australia ²	-7	40	47	-	13	-	(830)
Bangkok	(Not Asked)						
Saigon	" "						
Singapore	" "						

¹ Tabulations for France include responses before and after U.S. announcement of removal of its missiles from Turkey. Early question wording specified the Turkish missile bases.

² Australia's question was phrased "After the Cuban crisis, Russia removed its missiles from Cuba, which is only 200 miles from the U.S. Some people now say the U.S. should also move its missiles from bases near Russia - but others say the U.S. should not move those missiles. Do you think the U.S. should move its missiles away from Russia - or keep them there?"

The Issue of Guantanamo ...

In the four Latin American cities, the issue was posed, not in terms of far-away missile bases but in respect to a specific U.S. naval base in the hemisphere -- Guantanamo. The Guantanamo question was used both because it covered an issue much closer to home for most respondents and because there was a possibility that Castro himself might try to involve Guantanamo in the issue of Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

In general, awareness of Guantanamo's existence was rather low, ranging from 68 per cent in Caracas to 25 per cent in Rio.

Predominant approval of the U.S. base was voiced in Mexico City and Caracas. In Rio, however, the margin of approval was slight, while in Buenos Aires, opinion was rather evenly split.

"Do you happen to know whether or not the U.S. has a naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?"

	<u>Mexico</u> <u>City</u> <u>Feb.'63</u>	<u>Buenos</u> <u>Aires</u> <u>Feb/Mar.'63</u>	<u>Rio de</u> <u>Janeiro</u> <u>Feb.'63</u>	<u>Caracas</u> <u>Feb.'63</u>
No. of cases	(389)	(481)	(392)	(401)
Yes	42%	43%	25%	68%
No or Don't know	58	57	75	32
	100%	100%	100%	100%

"(It may interest you to know that) (As you know) the U.S. does have a naval base at Guantanamo based on a treaty between Cuba and the U.S. Do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. having such a base in Cuba?"

Approve	65%	35%	34%	48%
Disapprove	19	32	24	28
No opinion	16	33	42	24
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	46	3	10	20

Who Gained More from the Cuban Crisis? ...

Although the prevailing view in a majority of the nations and capital cities was that the U.S. gained more than the Soviet Union from the crisis, in a considerable number of areas -- particularly in Latin America -- opinion was divided rather evenly. In Tehran, in contrast, the Soviet Union was given a clear-cut margin. Only in four instances -- West Germany, Britain, Australia and Bangkok -- did public opinion line up really decisively behind the view that the U.S. was the winner.

"Who would you say has gained more from the recent Cuban crisis -- the U.S., the Soviet Union, or did they come out about even? (If 'U.S.' or 'Soviet Union' gained more): A great deal or only somewhat?" (Asked of those aware of the Cuban crisis.)

	Net U.S. Gain	U.S. gained a great deal more	U.S. gained what some more	Came out about even	Sov.Un. gained what some- deal more	Sov.Un. gained a great deal more	No opinion	Not asked	No. o cases
WESTERN EUROPE									
West Germany	46	34%	14%	25%	2%	4%	14	11	100 (120)
Great Britain	32	28	9	28	3	2	12	16	(118)
Italy	15	16	4	23	2	3	14	30	(120)
France	14	12	10	30	5	3	24	16	(120)
LATIN AMERICA									
Buenos Aires	14	13	7	17	2	4	5	52	(48)
Mexico City	9	10	6	21	4	3	4	52	(38)
Rio de Janeiro	5	5	3	13	1	2	5	71	(39)
Caracas	5	7	9	30	4	7	2	41	(40)
NEAR EAST									
Delhi	10	17	2	14	7	2	18	40	(50)
Beirut	1	11	13	21	16	7	4	28	(45)
Tehran	-12	11	7	23	7	23	10	19	(50)
FAR EAST									
Australia	35	27	16	21	4	4	3	25	(8)
Bangkok	32	19	27	22	10	4	11	7	(4)
Singapore	18	13	16	30	10	1	12	18	(4)
Saigon	14	17	10	13	7	6	13	34	(4)
Japan	6	5	10	14	7	2	25	37	(9)

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Improved Opinions of the U.S. as a Result of the Cuban Crisis ...

In no more than half of the nations did substantial proportions express an improved opinion of the U.S. as a result of the Cuban crisis. In as many nations -- particularly in Latin America -- those who felt their opinions had improved were matched by those who felt their opinions of the U.S. had declined. In a majority of nations, however, the greater part professed no change at all.¹

"Did the events in the recent Cuban crisis change your opinion of the U.S. in any way? If Changed: "All things considered, would you say that your opinion of the U.S. changed more in a favorable direction or more in an unfavorable direction?"

	Net Gain	More	More	No change	Not	No. of
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>favorable</u>	<u>unfavorable</u>	<u>reported</u>	<u>asked</u>	<u>cases</u>
West Germany	19	20%	1%	68%	11% ..100%	(1202)
Great Britain	13	16	3	63	18	(1186)
Italy	11	13	2	47	38	(1200)
France	7	10	3	71	16	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Rio de Janeiro	3	3	-	26	71	(392)
Mexico City	1	3	2	43	52	(389)
Buenos Aires	1	4	3	41	52	(481)
Caracas	-3	2	5	52	41	(401)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Delhi	24	26	2	32	40	(500)
Beirut ²	4	11	7	54	28	(459)
Tehran ²	-9	16	25	40	19	(500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Bangkok ²	62	64	2	27	7	(497)
Australia	34	40	6	29	25	(830)
Saigon ²	33	34	1	31	34	(493)
Singapore ²	16	24	8	50	18	(498)
Japan	-2	3	5	55	37	(995)

¹ Since the bulk of the populations in all areas reported generally favorable opinions toward the U.S. (varying from three-fourths in West Germany to about half in Japan), it can be assumed that a sizeable proportion of those reporting no change were already favorable to the U.S. and did not feel the Cuban crisis made them more so. See USIA report R-141-63 (R), "Some Indications of Worldwide Public Opinion Toward the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.," July 1963, Confidential.

² In Tehran, Beirut, Bangkok, Saigon, and Singapore question read "Would you say that as a result of the Cuban crisis your opinion of the U.S. (USSR) changed more in a favorable direction or more in an unfavorable direction, or didn't it change in either direction?" (Asked of those aware of the Cuban crisis.)

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Improved Opinions of the U.S.S.R. as a Results of the Cuban Crisis ...

The pattern of reaction toward the U.S.S.R. was similar to the reaction toward the U.S. In about half the nations surveyed more persons reported improved opinions than reported less favorable opinions as a result of the crisis. In about as many other places, the favorable and unfavorable changes were nearly equal. And again, in a majority of the nations, the greater part of the respondents did not report any change.¹

"Did the events in the recent Cuban crisis change your opinion of the Soviet Union in any way? If Changed: "All things considered, would you say that your opinion of the Soviet Union changed more in a favorable direction or more in an unfavorable direction?"

	Net Gain USSR	More favorable	More unfavorable	No change reported	Not asked	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>					16% ..100%	
France	18	20%	2%	62%		(1200)
Italy	11	14	3	45	38	(1200)
Great Britain	9	12	3	67	18	(1186)
West Germany	5	12	7	70	11	(1202)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Rio de Janeiro	-2	2	4	23	71	(392)
Buenos Aires	-3	3	6	39	52	(481)
Mexico City	-4	3	7	38	52	(387)
Caracas	-8	2	10	47	41	(401)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Tehran ²	31	38	7	36	19	(500)
Delhi	17	22	5	33	40	(500)
Beirut ²	2	11	9	52	28	(459)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Japan	4	8	4	51	37	(995)
Australia	3	19	16	40	25	(830)
Singapore ²	-7	14	21	47	18	(498)
Bangkok ²	-18	19	37	37	7	(497)
Saigon ²	-29	1	30	35	34	(493)

¹ Since the greater part of the respondents in most areas (exceptions are Tehran and Beirut) reacted unfavorably to the U.S.S.R. in general, it can be suspected that a considerable proportion of those reporting no change were already hostile to the Soviet Union and continued to be. See USIA report R-141-63 (R), "Some Indications of Worldwide Public Opinion Toward the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., July 1963, Confidential.

² In Tehran, Beirut, Bangkok, Saigon, and Singapore question read "Would you say that as a result of the Cuban crisis your opinion of the U.S. (USSR) changed more in a favorable direction or more in an unfavorable direction, or didn't it change in either direction?" (Asked of those aware of the Cuban crisis.)

Comparison of Opinion Changes for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. ...

As mentioned above, the pattern of reported opinion change was remarkably similar for the two nations. When a simplified table, showing net gains for each nation is presented, it can be seen that the U.S. bettered its position substantially in relation to the U.S.S.R. in three nations and slightly in three more, while the Soviet Union bettered its comparative position slightly in France and substantially in Tehran.

For the bulk of the nations, however, neither country seems to have gained at the expense of the other, by this criterion.

"Did the events in the recent Cuban crisis change your opinion of the U.S. (USSR) in any way?"

	Net Gain U.S.	Net Gain USSR	Relative Improvement, U.S. ¹
WHERE U.S. BETTERED ITS POSITION SUBSTANTIALLY IN RELATION TO USSR:			
Bangkok	62	-18	80
Saigon	33	-29	62
Australia	34	3	31
WHERE U.S. BETTERED ITS POSITION SLIGHTLY:			
Singapore	16	-7	23
West Germany	19	5	14
Delhi	24	17	7
WHERE THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN RELATIVE POSITION:			
Rio de Janeiro	3	-2	5
Mexico City	1	-4	5
Caracas	-3	-8	5
Great Britain	13	9	4
Buenos Aires	1	-3	4
Beirut	4	2	2
Japan	-2	4	2
Italy	11	11	0
WHERE U.S.S.R. BETTERED ITS POSITION SLIGHTLY:			
France	7	18	-11
WHERE U.S.S.R. BETTERED ITS POSITION SUBSTANTIALLY:			
Tehran	-9	31	-40

¹ This column represents the net gain of the U.S.S.R. subtracted from the net gain of the U.S. so as to give relative changes of position.

General Reaction to U.S. Foreign Policies ...

World opinion in general supported prior U.S. moves in international affairs. Opinion was fairly evenly divided in Japan and Tehran, but decidedly approving elsewhere. The question was posed so as to encourage respondents to think beyond the Cuban crisis in considering their reply, but the recorded reaction suggests that the responses were heavily influenced by the Cuban affair.¹

"Have you a favorable or unfavorable impression of what the American Government has been doing in international affairs recently? (PAUSE) Very or only somewhat?"

	Net Favorable	Favorable very	Favorable somewhat	Unfavorable somewhat	Unfavor- able very	No opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>							
West Germany	60	34%	31%	4%	1%	30%..100%	(1202)
Italy	42	32	16	3	3	46	(1200)
Great Britain	39	24	31	14	2	29	(1186)
France	25	8	38	19	2	33	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>							
Mexico City	57	31	35	6	3	25	(389)
Caracas	44	31	31	11	7	20	(401)
Buenos Aires	40	31	20	8	3	38	(481)
Rio de Janeiro	31	19	25	8	5	43	(392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Delhi	60	36	27	3	-	34	(500)
Beirut	24	17	39	20	12	12	(459)
Tehran	9	15	27	16	17	25	(500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Saigon	84	50	38	4	-	8	(490)
Australia	65	41	36	9	3	11	(830)
Bangkok	62	50	24	9	3	14	(497)
Singapore	42	-	59	17	-	24	(498)
Japan	-3	2	16	19	2	61	(997)

¹ For reasons of brevity, the "open-end" responses giving the reasons for favorable or unfavorable evaluations of American foreign policies have not been included in this report. Interested persons can examine the codified responses in the files of the Survey Research Division, IRS. Since the question above was asked before any direct questioning on the Cuban crisis, the responses could not have been affected by the introduction of that subject.

Reaction to Soviet Foreign Policies ...

Just as the reaction to American foreign policies was predominantly favorable, reactions to Soviet foreign policies were generally negative. There were exceptions, however; in France, Italy, Great Britain, Delhi, and particularly in Tehran, evaluations of recent Soviet international behavior were favorable in the net. Again, as in the case of the U.S., the evaluations were presumably colored by the Cuban crisis.

"Have you a favorable or unfavorable impression of what the Soviet Union has been doing in international affairs recently?"
(PAUSE) Very or only somewhat?"

	Net Favorable	Favorable very	Favorable somewhat	Unfavorable somewhat	Unfavor- able very	No opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>							
France	23	7%	38%	18%	4%	33%..100%	(1200
Italy	14	10	20	7	9	54	(1200
Great Britain	2	9	27	25	9	30	(1180
West Germany	-17	3	22	17	25	33	(1200
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>							
Rio de Janeiro	-6	5	17	12	16	50	(392
Caracas	-23	7	18	18	30	27	(400
Mexico City	-28	4	15	22	25	34	(380
Buenos Aires	-33	3	9	15	30	43	(480
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Tehran	55	32	35	8	4	21	(500
Delhi	25	15	26	12	4	43	(500
Beirut	-1	8	35	27	17	13	(450
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Singapore	-10	5	25	28	12	30	(490
Japan	-23	1	11	26	9	53	(990
Bangkok	-26	13	14	23	30	20	(490
Australia	-47	4	13	24	40	19	(830
Saigon	-72	1	4	20	57	18	(490

Comparative Evaluations of American and Soviet International Behavior ...

The table below shows comparative judgments on the international behavior of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union. In all but two countries, the net reaction to the U.S. was favorable while the net reaction to the U.S.S.R. was negative. Based on this measurement, the "lead" of the U.S. over the U.S.S.R. was generally substantial. In one nation -- France -- the net favorable reaction to the two powers was almost identical. In Tehran, the Soviet Union scored notably better than the U.S.

"Have you a favorable or unfavorable impression of what the American Government (Soviet Union) has been doing in international affairs recently? Very or only somewhat?"

	Net Favorable U.S.	Net Favorable USSR	U.S. Lead ¹
WHERE U.S. LEAD WAS SUBSTANTIAL:			
Saigon	84	-72	156
Australia	65	-47	112
Bangkok	62	-26	88
Mexico City	57	-28	85
West Germany	60	-17	77
Buenos Aires	40	-33	73
Caracas	44	-23	67
Singapore	42	-10	52
Great Britain	39	2	37
Rio de Janeiro	31	-6	37
Delhi	60	25	35
Italy	42	14	28
Beirut	24	-1	25
Japan	-3	-23	20
WHERE THE TWO NATIONS WERE RATED EVENLY:			
France	25	23	2
WHERE SOVIET LEAD WAS SUBSTANTIAL:			
Tehran	9	55	-46

¹ The "U.S. lead" figures in column three should not be considered as actual percentages but as convenient indices of distance between the two nations.

American Military Strength vs. Soviet Moderation ...

One final aspect of the reactions to the Cuban crisis appears, on balance, to represent more of a gain for the Soviet Union than for the United States. In at least half of the nations where the question was asked, Soviet moderation rather than superior American military strength¹ was believed to be the key factor in the peaceful outcome of the Cuban crisis. In the other five areas, opinion divided rather evenly. (In three nations substantial bodies of opinion felt that it was the peace efforts of other nations that had brought the crisis to a peaceful outcome.)

The results suggest, as an aftermath of the crisis, a definite enhancement of the Soviet image as moderate and reasonable. Studies over several years suggest a very definite ability on the part of the U.S.S.R. to modify international public opinion to an appreciable extent by displays of moderation.

"Which of the following is closest to your own opinion as to why there was a peaceful outcome of the Cuban crisis?"
(Not asked in the Near East and in Bangkok, Saigon and Singapore.)

	Moderation on the part of the <u>Russians</u>	Greater military strength of the U.S.	Peace efforts of other nations	No opinion	Not asked	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>						
Great Britain	32%	23%	16%	14%	18% ..103% ²	(1186)
West Germany	36	32	11	12	11 ..102% ²	(1202)
France	34	16	10	24	16 ..100%	(1200)
Italy	20	17	12	13	38	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Mexico City	10	13	23	2	52	(389)
Buenos Aires	16	14	12	6	52	(481)
Rio de Janeiro	7	6	10	6	71	(392)
Caracas	20	12	22	5	41	(401)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Japan	21	6	22	14	37	(995)
Australia	32	22	11	10	25	(830)

¹ While the wording of this question may be something less than ideal, analysis of volunteered responses of reasons for having a better opinion of the U.S.S.R. because of its behavior in the Cuban crisis supports the thesis that many were impressed by Soviet moderation.

² Totals in Britain and West Germany add to more than 100 per cent since a few respondents chose more than one reason.

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APPENDIX - SAMPLING SUMMARY

Western Europe

<u>Place</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Survey Dates</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Some Comments</u>
Britain	National	1186	Jan 19 - Feb 11, '63	Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Ltd., London	These are the same long established national samples that have been earlier used for West European regional reports.
France	National	1200	Jan 24 - Feb 8, '63	Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique, Paris	
W.Germany	National	1202	Jan 30 - Feb 20, '63	DIVO, Bad Godesberg	
Italy	National	1200	Feb 5-25, '63	Societa Internazionale per le Ricerche di Mercato, Milan	

Latin America

Mexico	Mexico City	389	February '63	Int'l Research Associates, S.A. de C.V., Mexico City	More extensive urban sampling, and rural sampling is possible but was foregone in the initial worldwide series in the interest of economy and because of concurrent seven-nation urban and rural survey on a broad range of issues. ¹
Brazil	Rio	392	February 6-21, '63	Instituto de Pesquisas de Opiniao e Mercado, Rio	
Argentina	Buenos Aires	481	Feb-March '63	Instituto IPSA, Buenos Aires	
Venezuela	Caracas	401	February '63	Int'l Research Associates, C.A., Caracas	

¹ See USIA report R-110-63(R), "The Economic and Political Climate of Opinion in Latin America and Attitudes Toward the Alliance for Progress," June 1963, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

Near East

<u>Place</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Survey Dates</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Some Comments</u>
India	New Delhi	500	March 1-15, '63	Indian Institute of Public Opinion, New Delhi	1961 electoral rolls were used to select respondents. All parts of metropolitan Delhi except Shahdara (where illiteracy is high) and Delhi Cantonment (where up-to-date lists were unavailable) were represented. Women are underrepresented in the sample due to difficulty in reaching them and eliciting co-operation.
Iran	Tehran	500	April 1 - May 10, '63	National Institute of Psychology, Tehran	Respondents were drawn from approximately 60% of Tehran -- the poorer areas being deliberately excluded in order to reduce the number of illiterates. All respondents were literate and had at least some formal education.
Lebanon	Beirut	459	June '63	Middle East Marketing Research Institute, Beirut	Random sample of Beirut with exception of dwellings in the central commercial district. In remaining districts blocks, and households within blocks, were randomly selected and heads of household were interviewed. Due to head of household requirement and the usual difficulty of interviewing women in the Arab World, sample is 84% male.
<u>Far East</u>					
Japan	National	995	February '63	Central Research Services, Inc., Tokyo	Random sample of all residents over 18 years of age.

(Continued on next page)

Far East (Contd)

<u>Place</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Survey Dates</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Some Comments</u>
Australia	Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide- Perth-Hobart- Launceston	830	Late March-Early Apr '63	Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty., Ltd., Melbourne	Interval (every nth address) sample was drawn from register of electors. Interviewees asked for the youngest male over 21 or, if there were no men, the youngest woman over 21. Results is a sample with younger men slightly over-represented.
Thailand	Bangkok	497	Late March '63	Coordination Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Bangkok	Cities were divided into areas. Approximately one-third of these were selected at random, and interviewers were given a plan by which a pre-determined number of interviews were conducted in each section. Poorer areas were deliberately excluded in an attempt to get only literate respondents, so the middle and upper classes are over-represented. Refusal rate was high among females; result, a sample of about 70 per cent male -- 30 per cent female.
South Viet-Nam	Saigon	493	Mar 28-Apr 3, '63	do	
Singapore	Singapore	498	March 21 - 25, '63	do	